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IN THE .SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
NELLIE· A. LOVET·T,
Plaintiff arnd Resp,o1Z1dent,
-vs.THE CON·TINENTAL BANK AND
TRUST C.OMPANY, a corporation,
Executor of the Estate of Mrs. J. U.
Giesy, also lmown as Juliet Galena
Giesy, Deceased,
Defendamt and App-ellant.

Civil
No. 8199

BRIE·F OF RES.PONDE:NT

STATEMENT ·OF' FAC·T·S
Mrs. J. U. Giesy, also known as Juliet ·Galena Giesy,
died testate on the 17th day of March, 1953, (R.104, 105).
She left an estate of the appraised value of approximately $60,000.00 (R. 103, 104). Under the terms of
Mrs. Giesy's will a cousin named Boyd Guthrie and his
wife, Anona Guthrie, of Rifle, Colorado, were named as
residuary legatees, and Anona Guthrie was named as
legatee of Mrs. Giesy's jewelry with the exception of one
diamond bracelet bequeathed to an Olive Taylor (Ex.
21, R. 137, 138). The will was executed on the 21st day
of February, 1951, (R. 143). The Continental Bank and
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Trost Company was 'appointed executor of the will (R.l,
5).
Mrs. Nellie A. Lovett, plaintiff and respondent, commenced this action against the Continental Bank and
T'rust Company, defendant and ap·pellant, as such ex·ecutor. Respondent's complaint consisted of two causes
of action (R. 1, 2).
In her first cause of action Mrs. Lovett sought the
recovery of certain items of jewelry (Exs. 3-11) in the
possession of the defendant executor. Mrs. Giesy had
given these items of jew·elry to Mrs. Lovett shortly prior
to Mrs. Giesy's death, infra p·. 11 et seq. After Mrs.
Giesy's death, Mrs. Lovett had, pursuant to an agreement between her then attorney, Mr. Edward M. Morrissey, and the executor bank, turned these items of
jewelry over to the executor for safekeeping pending the
disposition of this matter, infra p. 15, et seq.
Mrs. Lovett's second cause of action consisted of two
counts .. ·The first count was in quantum meruit for recovery of the reasonable value of certain services performed by Mrs. Lovett for Mrs. Giesy between the first
day of June, 1950, and the 16th day of March, 1953, at
Mrs. Giesy's special instance and request, which services were alleged to be of the reasonable value of $3,300.00. The second count was on an express contract of
Mrs. Giesy to pay Mrs. Lovett $3,300.00 for said services. Both counts were alleged in one paragraph (R. 2).
The defendant executor counterclaimed for the recovery of a large diamond ring (Ex. 1) in the possession
of Mrs. Lovett (R. 6). l\frs. Giesy had given this ring
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to Mrs. Lovett in November of 1952, approximately
four months prior to Mrs. Giesy 's death, infra p. 10 et
seq. It was not turned over to the executor for safekeeping with the je,welry described in respondent's first cause
of action, iJnfra p. 16 ·et seq.
The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the respondent and against the executor on the respondent's
first cause of action for the recovery of the items of
jewelry described therein (R. 186) and a verdict in favor
of the respondent and against the executor on respondent's second cause of action for the recovery of the reasonable value of respondent's services in the amount of
$3,300.00 (R.187) and a verdict in favor of the respondent
and against the executor on the executor's counterclaim
for the recovery of the large diamond ring (R. 188).
Judgment was entered in favor of the respondent on each
of the verdicts (R. 183-185), and the executor's motions
for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdicts
were denied (R. 197). The defendant executor appeals.
POINTS, AR,GUED BY RESPONDENT
1. THE EVID,ENCE VI AS SUF'FICIENT TO
SUPPORT 'l1 HE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN
FAV·OR OF RESPONDENT ON R,ES,PO,NDENT'S
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION F'OR. THin REC'OVER.Y
OF THE ITEMS OF JEWEI_jRY (EXS. 3-11, EXCEPT
EX. 6) THAT WERE TI-IE SUBJECT' MATTER
THEREOF·.
2. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUF'FICIEN'T 'TO
8UPPOR,T THE VER,DICT OF THE JUR,Y IN
FAVOR OF RESP·ONDENT ON R,ES,PONDENT'S
SECOND· CAUSE OF ACTION F'OR. THE RECOVERY
OF T'HE REASONABI__JE V Alj1TE OF: R,ES,PONDENT'S SERVICES.

1.

Whether or not the evidence was sufficient to
3
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support a re~covery on an express p-romise of
the decedent to pay respondent the sp·ecific sum
of $3,300.00 was immaterial.
2.

The evidence 'vas 'Sufficient to sup·port the verdict of the jury in favor of respondent for the
recovery on an implied promise of the reasonable value of respondent's services rendered at
decedent's special instance and request.

3. THE IN~STR.UC·TIO·NS. AS GIVEN DID NO·T
PLACE THE BURDE.N ON APPELLANT ·OF. NEGATIVING A GIF'T· OF' THE LARGE DIAMOND RING
(E,X. 1) THAT WAS. THE SUBJECT OF. APPELLANT''S CO'UNTER.CLAIM. THE INSTRUC·TIONS
DID NO·T PREJUDICE APPELLANT.
4. THE INSTRUCTI'ONS AS GIVE.N WER.E
NOT· A MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW PERTAINING TO DE.LIVERY OF THE GIF'T OF JEWELRY
(EXS.. 3-11, EXCEPT EX. 6) T'HAT WAS· THE SUBJECT O·F' RES.P·ONDENT'S FIRST CAUSE· OF ACTION. THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PREJUDICE
APPELLANT·.

STATE,MENT OF EVIDENCE
We do not agree with app·ellant's statem·ent of facts.

1. E.VIDENCE IN SUPPOR:T OF R.ECOVERY
OF REASONABLE VALUE OF RE'SPONDEN·T'S
S·ERVICES.
At the outset it is to be noted that appellant claims
that the evidence was not sufficient to sup·port the verdict
of the jury in favor of respondent on resp·ondent's second
cause of action for the recovery on an implied contract of
the reasonable value of respondent's services rendered
to the decedent at the decedent's sp~ecial instance and
request. (Appellant's brief pp. 17-22.) The evidence in
sup·port of respondent's second cause of action was as
follows.
4
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In May of 19·50 the circumstances of the parties were
as follows. Mrs. Giesy was 73 years of age. She was
frail and required a great deal of attention (R. 26, 73).
She was the widow of Dr. J. U. Giesy, a former practicing physician in Salt Lake City, Utah, who had died in
approximately 1945 (R. 25,115, 125). She had no children
and no brothers or sisters (R. 25). Her only relatives
were an aunt named JUliet Guthrie and a cousin named
Boyd Guthrie and his wife, Anona Guthrie, all of whom
lived in Rifle, Colorado (R. 25). She lived alone in the
Maryland Apartments on East South Temple Street in
Salt Lake City, Utah, (R. 2·5). She occupied a large
apartment consisting of a living room, dining room, bedroom, bathroom, kitchen and a long connecting hall (R.
71). Up to May of 1950 she had employed a Mrs. Gaynor
(Ganger R. 56) to take care of her (R. 56). Mrs. Ganger
quit working for l\!rs. Giesy in May of 1950 (R. 26).
Mrs. Giesy had previously become acquainted with the
respondent, Mrs. Lovett, through Mrs. Ganger (R. 56).
Mrs. Lovett is the wife of Mr. Harry D. Lovett. Mr.
Lovett has been employed as an accountant for the Utah
Power & Light Company for the past 31 years (R. 24).
In May of 1950 Mrs. Giesy called Mrs. Lovett on the
telephone and asked her to corne to Mrs. Giesy's apartment because she wanted to talk to her (R. 25). Mrs.
Lovett and her husband, Mr. Harry D. Lovett, went to
Mrs. Giesy's apartment in response to the telephone call.
Mrs. Giesy had the following conversation with Mrs.
Lovett in the presence of Mr. Lovett. Mrs. Giesy told
Mrs. Lovett that Mrs. Ganger had quit working for her.

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

She asked Mrs. Lovett if Mrs. Lovett would take over
Mrs. Ganger's work and do Mrs. Giesy's housework and
beauty work. 'She told Mrs. Lovett that the beauty work
would consist of washing and tinting her hair, giving her
a facial, and doing her nails every Saturday and generally taking care of her hair and personal appearance
throughout the week. Mrs. Lovett replied that she would.
Mrs. Giesy then said, "I don't want you to he concerned
about the pay, because you will be well paid for your
services." (R. 26, 27.)
Thereaf-ter, Mrs. Lovett corrrmenced working for
Mrs. Giesy on approximately June 1, 1950, (R. 27). Mrs.
Lovett went to Mrs. Giesy's apartment daily (R. 29).
She p·repared Mrs. Giesy's meals, washed the dishes, polished the floors, dusted the furniture, washed the windows, hung the curtains and did the general housework
(R. 28, 61, 70, 71). Each Saturday she washed and tinted
Mrs. ·Giesy's hair, gave her a facial and manicured her
nails. (R. 28).
Mrs. Giesy was in the hospital for two weeks during
the month of June, 19·50, (R. 29). When Mrs. Giesy was
released from the hospital, on the advice of her doctor,
slie e·mployed a Mrs. Alene Douglas to work five days a
week and to stay with her at night for approximately
one month until August 1, 1950, (R. 29, 30). During the
p·eriod that Mrs. Douglas was there, Mrs. Lovett continued to work for Mrs. Giesy and did the same work
that she had previously done (R. 30, 31).
Mrs. Douglas quit on approximately August 1, 19'50,
(R. 31). At that time Mrs. Giesy had the following con6
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versation with Mrs. Lovett in the presence of Mr. Lovett
and Mrs. D·ouglas. Mrs. Giesy told Mrs. Lovett that Mrs.
Douglas was quitting and asked Mrs. Lovett if she would
continue on with her work. Mrs. Lovett said she would.
Mrs. Giesy also asked Mrs. Lovett to accompany her
when she went downtown because her doctor (Dr. David
E. ·Smith, R. 116) had advised her that she could not go
downtown alone. She also asked Mrs. Lovett to stay with
her at night. (R. 31, 32.)
During the twenty-six month period from August 1,
1950, to October 1, 1952, Mrs. Lovett did the following
work for Mrs. Giesy. Mrs. Lovett continued to do Mrs.
Giesy's general housework, prepare her meals, do the
dishes and do Mrs. Giesy's beauty work (R. 33-35, 61, 6971.) Mrs. Lovett took Mrs. Giesy to her doctor two or
three times a week. She went back and stayed with Mrs.
Giesy at night for two or three hours each night (R. 32,
60.) During this period Mrs. Lovett spent an average of
n1ore than six hours a day at Mrs. Giesy's apartment and
two or three hours at night ( R. 34). On several occasions
during this period Mrs. Giesy told Mr. Frank J. Nelson,
a lifetime acquaintance of Mrs. Giesy's and disinterested
witness, of the work Mrs. Lovett was doing for her and
in particular that Mrs. Lovett was doing her housework,
preparing her meals, doing her beauty work and taking
care of her business (R. 92-93). Mrs. Giesy, on many
occasions during this period, told Mrs. Lovett that she
need not be concerned about her pay; and, that she would
be well paid for her services (R. 35). During this entire
twenty-six month period Mrs. Giesy employed no other
help, with the exception of a negro woman who worked
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for her ·a total of three days (R. 35).

Mrs. Giesy went to the hospital on Octobe·r 1, 1952.
She was in the hospital until ap·proximately November
15, 195·2, as a result of a serious skin ailment on her face,
neck and ears. (R. 35, 36.) During this period ¥rs. Lovett ,A
j, t:
y :S
/'•
did the following work. She did Mrs.' neauty work and
shop·ping. She laundered Mrs. Giesy's clothes daily. Mrs.
Lovett, on ·advice of Mrs. Giesy's doctor, was required to
disinfect her hands with lysol each time she handled Mrs.
Giesy's clothes. She also took care of all of Mrs. Giesy's
correspondence, which consisted of reading Mrs. Giesy's
mail to her, writing for her and writing her checks, because the skin diseas-e prevented Mrs. Giesy from wearing
do
yJ/,
her spectacles and ·she could not see toI the work. Mrs.
Lovett stayed with Mrs. Giesy at the hospital at night
when she was not covered by a special nurse. See testimony of Mr. Harry D. Lovett (R. 36-37, 66) and testimony of Mayme C. Garrison, Mrs. Giesy's nurse, (R.
9·6-, 100).
It: S

Mrs. Giesy· was released from the hospital in approximately the middle of November, 1952, (R. 38). Durmg the period from November 15, 1952, to March 15,
1953, Mrs. Lovett continued to work for Mrs. Giesy. She
did the following work. She prepared Mrs. Giesy's meals,
did her beauty work and did general housework such as
washing the floors and dusting. She took Mrs. Giesy to
the doctor because Mrs. Giesy could not go alone. She
took care of Mrs. Giesy's correspondence, wrote her letters, _took care of Mrs. Giesy's bills and wrote her checks
because Mrs. Giesy was having difficulty with her eyes.
8
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She relieved a practical nurse at night. She worked for
Mrs. Giesy an average of five or six hours a day. See
testimony of Mr. Harry D. Lovett (R. 39-40) and testimony of Mrs. Kathryn Maddocks (R. 76-78, 86-87). During this period Mrs. Giesy had the following additional
help. A Mrs. Haig and a night nurse were employed to
stay with Mrs. Giesy for approximately one month after
Mrs. Giesy was discharged from the hospital. Mrs. Haig
and the night nurse were released in the middle of December, 1952, (R. 38, 29). Thereafter a Mrs. Kathryn
Maddocks was employed as a practical nurse for Mrs.
Giesy until March 15, 19·53, (R. 38, 39, 75). On March 15,
19·53, Mrs. Giesy again went to the hospital (R. 75, 76).
She died on March 17, 1953, (R. 97, 98, 104, 105).
Mrs. Lovett worked for Mrs. Giesy a total of 33
months. She worked every day. She worked an average
of in excess of six hours per day. (R. 41, 77, 78.) Mrs.
l\faddocks testified that the reasonable value of, and
ordinary charge for, services such as those performed by
Mrs . Lovett for Mrs. Giesy throughout the entire period,
was $1.25 to $1.50 an hour (R. 78).
Mrs. Giesy repeatedly told Mrs. Lovett not to be
concerned about her pay; and, that she would he well paid
for her services. See testimony of Mr. Harry D. Lovett
(R. 27, B5, 41) and corroborating testimony of Mrs.
Maddocks (R. 78) and Mr. Frank J. Nelson (R. 9·4, 95).
Mrs. Lovett's second cause of
to the jury under instructions that
a preponderance of the evidence:
formed services for Mrs. Giesy at

action was submitted
the jury must find by
that Mrs. Lovett perMrs. Giesy's request;

9
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that it was contemplated by Mrs. Giesy ·and Mrs. Lovett
that Mrs. Giesy would pay Mrs. Lovett for such services;
that Mrs. Giesy did not pay Mrs. Lovett for such services; and, that in determining the reasonable value of
such services the jury might consider the nature of the
services, the length of time required to perform the services and the relationship· between the p:arties. See Instruction No. 3 (R. 168), Instructi·on No.7 (R. 173), Instruction No. 10 (R. 176) and Instruction No.11 (R.177).
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Lovett on
her s-econd cause of action in the amount of $3,300.00 (R.
187). We submit that the verdict was amply sup·ported
by a p·reponderance of the evidence.
2. EVIDENCE IN SUPPO·RT· OF' GIFT TORES:PONDE.NT O·F DIAMOND· RING (EX. 1).
The evidence in support of the verdict of the jury
in favor of the respondent and against the appellant on
appellant's counterclaim for recovery of the large diamond ring (Ex. 1, R. 41, 4·2, 45) was as follows. Mrs.
Giesy purchased the large diamond ring from Daynes
Jewelry Company in December of 1950 (R. 4·2, 89, 90).
·On the day that Mrs. Giesy purcha;sed the ring, Mr.
Lovett took Mrs. Giesy and Mrs. Lovett home to Mrs.
Giesy's apartment. Mrs. Giesy showed the ring to Mr.
Lovett in Mrs. Lovett's presence and said, "This ring is
to be your wife's. I bought it for her." (R. 42, 43.)
In March of 1952, approximately a year p·rior to Mrs.
Giesy's death, she told Mr. Alex P. Anderson, the manager of Daynes J'ewelry Company, that she was going to
give the large diamond ring to Mrs. Lovett (R. 89-91).

10
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In November of 1952, after Mrs. Giesy was released
from the hospital, she gave the ring to Mrs. Lovett in
Mr. Lovett's presence under the following circumstances.
Mrs. Giesy said to Mrs. Lovett that the ring was getting
too large for her and she could not wear it any more. She
then said, ''I've given it to you, so now I want you to have
it." Thereupon she handed the ring to Mrs. Lovett in an
envelope (Ex. 2) inscribed, "To My' Witto' Nell-Galena".
(R. 43-46.) The large diamond ring has been in Mrs.
Lovett's possession ever since that occurrence (R. 44).
Appellant offered no evidence in support of its
counterclaim for the recovery of the large diamond ring,
and the testimony of appellant's own witness, Dr. David
E. Smith, was that Mrs. Giesy had given the ring to Mrs.
Lovett (R. 119-120). We submit that the evidence is conclusive that Mrs. Giesy gave Mrs. Lovett the large diamond ring and that as a matter of law Mrs. Lovett is entitled to the ring as against appellant's counterclaim.
3. EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF GIFT TO RESPONDENT OF JEWELRY (EXS. 3-11, EXCEPT EX.
6).

Appellant clai1ns that the evidence was not sufficient
to support the verdict of the jury in favor of respondent
on respondent's first cause of action for recovery of the
items of jewelry (Exs. 3-11, with the exception of Ex. 6)
that were the subject matter thereof. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 9-13.) The evidence in support of respondent's first
cause of action was as follows.
Mrs. Giesy executed her last will and testament on
the 21st day of F'ebruary, 1951, (R. 143). Under the terms
11
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of the will, Anona Guthrie, the wife of Mrs. Giesy's
cousin, Boyd Guthrie, was named as legatee of Mrs.
Giesy's jewelry with the exception of one diamond bracelet bequeathed to an Olive Taylor. (Ex. 21, R. 137, 138.)

..... --:?>

When Mrs. Giesy was in the hospital in October of
1952, she had a conversation with Mrs. Lovett in the
presence of Mr. Lovett with reference to her jewelry in
which she said that Dr. Smith had made arrangements
with the sup:erintendent of the hospital to p·ut her jewelry
in the hosp·ital t7~ault. She then told Mrs. Lo;vett that Dr.
'Smith might/well have turned it over to Mrs. Lovett,
because she was going to have it anyway. She then said,
" * * * because Anona will never wear any of my
jewelry." (R. 46.)
Miss Mayme C. Garrison attended Mrs. Giesy as a
special nurse while Mrs. Giesy was in the hospital in
October of 1952 (R. 96). Mrs. Giesy at that time told
Miss Garrison that, "She wanted Mrs. Lovett to have
her jewelry," ·and that the Guthries had had all of her estate that they would get (R. 97). Mrs. Giesy also told Mr.
Frank Jl. Nelson in a conversation concerning h·er will
that the Guthries would receive nothing from her (R.
94). The latter conversation occurred in March of 1952,
ap·proximately a year prior to Mrs. Giesy's death (R.
93).
On Friday, March 13, 1953, Mrs. Kathryn Maddocks
was attending Mrs. Giesy. Mrs. Giesy became very seriously ill. She continued to get worse until Sunday morning, March 15, 1953. On S·unday morning Dr. Smith came
to Mrs. Giesy's apartment. (R. 79, 117.) Mrs. Maddocks
12
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testified that at that time Dr. Smith and Mrs. Giesy had
the following conversation in her presence. Dr. Smith
told Mrs. Giesy that she would have to go to the hospital.
Dr. Smith then asked Mrs. Giesy what she wanted done
with her jewels while she was ill. Mrs. Giesy replied, "I
want Nell to have them, they are hers.'' Mrs. Giesy then
handed her jewel box (Ex. 12, R. 81) to Mrs. Maddocks
and said, "These are for Nell, give them to Nell.'' (R. 79,
80, 83.) The jewel box contained Mrs. Giesy's jewelry
(Exs. 3-11, except Ex. 6). (R.. 49, 50.) Dr. Smith then
left for the hospital (R. 79, 80, 118). He had previously
called an ambulance for Mrs. Giesy (R. 118).
Thereafter the ambulance came, and Mrs. Giesy told
Mrs. Maddocks to follow her to the hospital with the
jewels. Mrs. Maddocks had a blowout in the driveway of
the apartment. (R. 80.) She went back to the apartment
and called the Lovetts and told them what had happened.
The Lovetts said they would com·e and take her to the
hospital. (R. 48, 80.) When the Lovetts arrived at the
apartment, Mrs. ~1:addocks handed the jewel box to Mrs.
Lovett and said, "11rs. Giesy said you were to have these
jevvels." (R. 80.)
Mr. Lo;vett then drove Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. Maddocks to the hospital (R. 49, 81). Mrs. Lovett and Mrs.
Maddocks went to Mrs. Giesy's room. While they were
there, Mrs. Lovett asked Mrs. Giesy whether she should
turn the jewels over to the Continental Bank. Mrs. Giesy
replied, "No, those jewels are yours, Nell." (R.. 81, 84.)
Mr. Lovett took Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. Maddocks home.
(R. 50, 81.)

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

That evening Mr. and Mrs. Lovett returned to the
hospital and visited Mrs. Giesy. Mrs. Lovett again asked
Mrs. Giesy whether or not she wante-d Mrs. Lo¥ett to turn
the jHwelry that Mrs. Maddocks had delivered to her over
to the executor of Mrs. Giesy's estate. Mrs. Giesy replied,
''No, the vultures will be after my things soon enough.
I want you to have them." (R. 51, 52.)
Thereafter Mr. Lovett placed the jewelry in his safe
deposit box in the Walker Bank and Trust Company (R.
52).
Mrs. Giesy wore her diamond earrings (Ex. 6) to the
hospital (R. 98, 99). On Tuesday morning, March 17,
1953, Miss Mayme C. Garrison, Mrs. Giesy's nurse, telep,honed the Lovetts and told th.em that Mrs. Giesy was
dying. (R. 52, 98.) About twenty minutes later Dr. Srnith
calle-d and told the L·ovetts that Mrs. Giesy was dead (R.
52). They both asked ~fr. and Mrs. Lovett to hurry up
to the ho'Spital (R. 52, 53). Mr. and Mrs. Lovett went
to the hospital and met Miss Garrison at Mrs. Giesy's
room. (R. 53). Miss Garrison told Mrs. Lovett that Mrs.
Giesy said Mrs. Lovett was to have her jewelry and then
asked Mrs. Lovett if she would care to remove Mrs.
Giesy's earrings from her. Mrs. Lovett replied that she
would not and asked Miss Garrison to do so. Miss Garrison then removed the earrings and handed them to Mrs.
Lovett. (R. 99.) At the close of respondent's evidence
respondent's counsel agreed that respondent's first
cause of action so far as it pertained to the earrings (Ex.
6) be di'smiss,ed because respondent's evidence affirmatively showed that the earrings were not delivered to
respondent prior to Mrs. Giesy's death (R. 114).

14
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The apprtaised value in probate of all of the jewelry
involved in this case·, including the large diamond ring,
was $5,000.00. The retail value of all of the jewelry, including the large diamond ring, was $7 ,000.00. ( R. 104.)
In March of 1953, at the inception of the dispute involved in this matter, Mrs. Lovett employed Mr. Edward
M. Morrissey, a member of the Utah State Bar, to represent her (R. 107, 108). Thereafter Mr. Morrissey had a
conversation with Mr. W. L. O'Meara, the trust officer of
the Continental Bank and T'rust Company, with reference to the jewelry involved in this action. They both
expressed the view that they did not want a lawsuit and,
in order to avoid difficulties, agreed to the following:
tliat Mr. O·'Meara would make formal demand on lVlrs.
Lovett through 1\tfr. Morrissey for return of the jewelry;
that on receipt of the demand Mr. Morrissey would advise
Mrs. Lovett to deposit the jewelry with the executor bank
for safekeeping only; and, that in so doing Mrs. Lovett
vvould not be relinquishing any right or waiving any claim
that she might have to the jewelry and she would not be
admitting anything with reference to her claim to the
jewelry. See testirnony of Mr. Edward M. Morrissey
(R. 108-111) and testimony of Mr. W. L. O'Meara (R.
135-136). Thereafter 1fr. O'JYleara, by letter dated ApTil
3, 1953, (Ex. 15) made demand on 1\irs. Lovett through
Mr. Morrissey for ·each of the items of jeweiry described
in respondent's first cause of action (Exs. 3-11, R. 1) and
for the large diamond ring (Ex. 1, R. 6) described in
appellant's counterclaim (R. 108, 113).
Upon receipt of the letter from Mr. O'M·ea.ra, Mr.

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Morrissey had the following conversation with Mrs.
Lovett. H·e told Mrs. Lovett of his conversation with Mr.
O'Meara and advised Mrs. Lovett th·at she should turn
over all of the jewelry, except the large diamond ring,
to the executor for safekeeping pursuant to his agreement
with Mr. O'Meara to the effect tHat in so doing she
would not be relinquishing any of her rights to the jewelry and that it would he deposited with the hank for safekeeping only pending disp-osition of this matter. With
reference to the large diamond ring, Mr. Morrissey advised Mrs. Lovett that, under the circumstanees she relate·d to him, she should not turn it over to the bank because it was his opinion that neither the heirs nor anyone ·else would make any claim to it (R. 110-112). Thereafter on April 7, 1953, Mrs. Lovett, pursuant to Mr.
Morrissey's recommendation, delivered all of the items
of jewelry (Exs. 3-11) to the executor bank, with exception of the large diamond ring (Ex. 1), and obtained a
receipt for the same (Ex.16, R.111, 113).
As a part of respondent's case Mrs. Lovett was called
as a witness to testify in her own behalf, not as to her
transactions with decedent or as to any matters equally
within hers and decedent's knowledge, but only with
regard to the circumstances connected with her turning
the jewelry over to the bank after deeedent'·s death. App·ellant objected that, since Mrs. Lovett was a party to
an action against th·e executor of a decedent's estate, the
dead man's statute, ·section 78-24-2, U.C.A., 1953, made
her incompetent to testify as a witness regardless of
whether or not her testimony related to transactions with
the decedent or matters equally within hers and the de-

16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cedent's knowledge. The trial court sustained appellant's
objection and refused to permit Mrs. Lovett to testify
to the circumstances connected with her turning the
jewelry over to the bank after decedent's death. (R. 105.)
R.espondent's first cause of action for recovery of
the items of jewelry (Exs. 3-11, except Ex. 6) and appellant's counterclaim for recovery of the large diamond
ring (Ex. 1) were both submitted to the jury under instructions that the burden was on respondent to prove
each of the elements of a gift of each of the items of
jewelry involved in this case~ by clear and convincing evidence. See Instruction No. 6A (R. 172) and Instruction
No. 9 (R. 175). The jury returned a verdict in favor of
respondent on her first cause of action for recovery of
the items of jewelry that were the subject matter thereof
and a verdict in favor of respondent and ~against appellant on appellant's counterclaim for the large diamond
ring (R. 186, 188). We submit that the verdicts were
amply supported by the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE E.VIDENCE W A'S SUF'FICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN
F AV·OR OF RESPONDENT ON R.ES.PONDENT'S
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION F'OR THE RECOVERY
OF THE ITEM'S OF JEWELRY (EXS. 3-11, EXCEPT
EX. 6) THA·T WERE THE SUB~JECT· MATTER.
THEREOF·.
At the outset appellant sets forth the rule that the
burden is on one who claims title to personal property
by gift to prove all of the elements of a gift including
17
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the intention of the donor by clear and convincing evidence. (App·ellant's brief, pp. 9-11, citing Jones v. Cook,
118 U. 562, 223 P. 2d 423, 1950.) Appellant than purports
to quote certain testimony from the record and from that
testimony argues that the facts in the case before this
court are not clear and convincing to the effect that Mrs.
Giesy gave the items of jewelry that were the subject
of respondent's first cause of action (Exs. 3-11, except
Ex. 6) to Mrs. Lovett and, therefore, the verdict of the
jury on respondent's first cause of action should be set
aside. (Ap·pellant's brief, pp. 12, 13.)
Ap·pellant''S conclusion is not correct. The trial court
instructed the jury that the burden was on respondent to
prove each of the elements of a. gift of the jewelry involved in this case by clear and convincing evidence, and
that the intention of the donor to make a gift must be
shown by the evidence to he clear and unmistakable, Instruction No. 6A (R. 172) and Instruction No.9 (R. 175).
We submit that tlie evidence was clear and convincing
that Mrs. Giesy gave respondent the jewelry (Exs. 3-11,
except Ex. 6) that was the subject of respondent's first
cause of action, and that in any event there was substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury.
Respondent's e·vidence was as follows. After Mrs.
Giesy executed her will in F'ebruary of 19·51, (R. 143) she
repeatedly stated 'that she was going to give her jewelry
to Mrs. Lovett and th·at the Guthries had had all of her
estate that they would get. See testimony of Mr. Lovett
(R. 46), Miss Mayme C. Garrison (R. 96, 97) and Mr.
Flrank J. N·elson (R. 94). On March 15, 1953, when Dr.
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Smith told Mrs. Giesy that she would have to go to the
hospital and asked her what she wanted done with her
jewels, Mrs. Giesy replied, ''I want Nell to have them,
they are hers." Mrs. Giesy then handed her jewel box to
Mrs. Maddocks and said, "These are for Nell, give them
to Nell." (R. 79, 80, 83). Thereafter Dr. Smith left for
the hospital (R. 79, 80, 118). When the ambulance came,
Mrs. Giesy told Mrs. Maddocks to follow her to the hospital with the jewels, but due to difficulty with her automobile Mrs. Maddocks was unable to do so (R. 80). Mrs.
Maddocks called the Lovetts and told them what had
happened, and the Lovetts said that they would come and
take her to the hospital. (R. 48, 80.) When the Lovetts
arrived at the apartment, Mrs. Maddocks handed the
jewel bo:x to Mrs. Lovett and said, "1'Irs. Giesy said you
were to have these jewels." ( R. 80) . '11hereafter on two
occasions Mrs. Lovett asked Mrs. Giesy at the hospital
whether or not Mrs. Giesy wanted Mrs. Lovett to turn the
jevvels that Mrs. ~1addocks had delivered to her over to
the executor. Mrs. Giesy replied, "No, those jewels are
yours, Nell," (R. 81, 84) and "No, the vultures will be
after my things soon enough, I ·w-ant you to have them."
(R. 51, 52.) Supra., p. 11 et seq.
Furthermore the inferences dravvn by appellant from
the record are not correct.
1. Appellant claims that the fact that Mrs. Giesy
directed Mrs. Maddocks to follow the ambulance to the
hospital with the jewelry evidenced a clear intention on
the part of Mrs. Giesy to retain dominion and control
over the jewelry, appellant's brief, p. 12. Mrs. Giesy's
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direction to Mrs. Maddocks to follow her to the hospital
with the jewels was not inconsistent with her direction
to Mrs. Maddocks to give the jewels to Mrs. Lovett. Following that occurrence Mrs. Giesy told Mrs. Lovett at the
hospital on two occasi~ons, in response to a question as
to whether or not Mrs. Lovett should turn the jewelry
over to the executor, that Mrs. Lovett should not do so,
that the jewels belonged to Mrs. Lovett and that she
wanted Mrs. Lovett to have them. The other testimony
detailed above evidences a clear intention on the part of
Mrs. Giesy to give the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett.
2. Appellant asserts that 1\irs. Giesy told Dr. Smith
that she would have Mrs. Lovett take_ charge of her jewelry while she was in the hospital, appellant's brief, p. 12.
D-r. Smith so testified (R. 117). From this testimony appellant infers that Mrs. Giesy did not intend to give the
jewelry to Mrs. Lovett, ibid. p. 12. Mrs. Maddocks testified that Mrs. Giesy told Dr. Smith, ''I want Nell to have
them, they are hers,'' and then handed her jewel hox to
Mrs. Maddocks and said, "These are for Nell, give them
to Nell." The othe-r testimony detailed above is directly
in conflict with that of Dr. Smith on this issue and evidences a clear intention on the part of Mrs. Giesy to give
the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett.
3. Appellant asserts that the verdict of the jury
is not supported by clear and convincing evidence th.at
Mrs. Giesy did give Mrs. Lovett the jewelry because Mrs.
Lovett did not take the witness stand to rebut the testimony of Dr. Smith, Mr. O'Meara and Mr. D. A. Skeen
t~o the effect that Mrs. Lovett did not tell them that Mrs.
20
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Giesy gave her the jewelry in certain conversations concerning turning the jewelry over to the executor, appellant's brief, pp. 12-13. We submit that that above conclusion is not correct and that no such inference can be
drawn from the record.
a.

Mrs. Lovett took the witness stand as a part of

her own case to testify to the, circumstances following
Mrs. Giesy's death connected with her turning the jewelry over to the executor bank. Appellant objected that
the dead man's statute, Sec. 78-24-2, U.C.A., 1953, made
Mrs. Lovett incompetent to testify as a witness regardless of the fact that her proffered testimony pertained
to matters that occurred after Mrs. Gjesy's death and not
to ·any transactions with the decedent or matters equally
within hers and the decedent's knowledge. The trial
court sustained appellant's objection and refused to permit Mrs. Lovett to testify to the circumstances connected
with turning the jewelry over to the executor. (R.. 105.)
Supra, p. 16, et seq. Section 78-24-2, U.C.A., 1953, makes
a party to an action against an executor incompetent to
testify only as to transactions with the decedent and matters equally within the party's and the decedent's knowledge.
b. Furthermore, the testimony of Dr. Smith, Mr.
O'Meara and Mr. Skeen was so conflicting and so irreconcilable with the basic facts of the case that it was apparent that these winesses were testifying to their present impressions of a past event and not to what they actually saw and heard. Respondent's counsel, therefore,
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determined that it was not necessary to call Mrs. Lovett
in rebuttal.
Dr. Smith testified that, when Mrs. Giesy arrived at
the hospital, Mrs. Giesy explained to him that she was
late because she waited until Mrs. Lovett came to the
apartment and that she then turned the jewelry over to
Mrs. Lovett herself (R. 118, 123, 124). Mr. Skeen testified that Mrs. Lovett told him that, when Mrs. Giesy
left for the ho:spital, Mrs. Lo~ett put the j·ewelry in the
jewel box and took it herself (R. 139, 144). The actual
facts, as testified to by Mrs. Maddocks who was present
at the time, were as follows. Mrs. Giesy handed the jewel
box to Mrs. Maddocks with directions to give the jewels
to Mrs. Lovett. After Mrs. Giesy left for the hospital,
Mrs. Maddocks attempted to follow the ambulance. She
had a mrshap· with her automobile and called the Lovetts.
W:hen Mrs. Lovett arrived at the apartment, Mrs. 1\Iad·docks handed the jewel box to Mrs. Lovett and said,
"Mrs. Giesy said you were to have these jewels." (R.
79, 80, 82, 83.)
Mr. O'Meara testified that in the c'Onference in Mr.
Sk·een's office Mts. Lovett said that she would not turn
the large diamond ring (Ex. 1) over to the executor because it had been given to her (R. 131). Mr. Skeen testified th·at in the same conference Mrs. Lovett made no
claim to any of the jewelry and in particular that she
did not claim ownership of the large diamond ring (R.
144).

-

c.

Ap·p·ellant asserts that Mrs. Lovett told Mr.
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O'Meara in the conference with Mr. Skeen that she had
the jewelry for "safekeeping'', appellant's brief, p. 13.
Mr. O'Meara's testimony vvas not to that effect. Mr.
O'Meara testified that Mr·s. Lovett told him that she had

the jewelry in her safety deposit box for the purpose of
safekeeping and not that she was holding it for safekeeping. (R. 131.)
d. Furthermore the record shows the following.
Mrs. Giesy gave the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett on M~arch 15,
1953. Mrs. Giesy died on March 17, 1953. In March of
1953, Mrs. Lovett employed an attorney to represent her
at the inception of the dispute involved in this matter
(R.. 107, 108). Thereafter she deposited the jewelry with
the executor bank for safekeeping only, and only on the
condition that in so doing she was not relinquishing any
of her rights, or waiving her cl~aim, or admitting anything with reference to her clain1, to the jewelry. See
testimony of ~1:r. Edward 1\f. Morrissey (R. 108-111) and
testimony of Mr. vV. L. O'Meara (R. 135-136). Supra, p.
15 et seq. r,rrs. Lovett did not deposit the large diamond ring with the executor because her attorney advised
her not to do so because it was his opinion that under the
circumstances neither the heirs nor anyone else would
make any claim to it (R. 111-112). The large diamond
ring had been given to Mrs. Lovett in November of 1952,
four months prior to Mrs. Giesy's death (R. 43-46).
The decision in Jones v. Cook, 118 U. 562, 223 P. 2d
423, appellant's brief, pp. 10-11, is to be distinguished
on its facts and in principle from the case before this
23
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court. In Jones v. Cook the plaintiffs, residuary legatees
under the will of their father, sued the defendant ·executor
for conversion of an automobile that belonged to the
father during his lifetime. The defendant executor was
also a son of the decedent. The defendant pleaded as
defenses that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the
statute of limitations and a decree in the probate proceedings. The defendant claimed for the first time at trial
that he acquired title to the automobile by gift from the
decedent. ·The only evidence in support of the defendant's
claim -of a gift was his wife'·s testimony to the effect that
the decedent had given him the automobile a few weeks
prior to decedent's death. ·The evidence showed that the
automobile had remained in the possession of the decedent and his wife most of the time after the alleged time
of the gift, that the certificate of title was never endorsed
by the decedent to the defendant and that the defendant
did not claim that the decedent had given the automobile
to him for over four years after the decedent's death. The

trial court refused to find that the decedent had given
the automobile to the defendant. The supreme court affirme·d the decision of the. trial court on that issue.
The case before this court was submitted to the jury
under instructions that the burden was on respondent to
prove all the elements of a gift by clear and convincing
evidence, and the jury found in favor of respondent. We
submit that the verdict was amply sup·p-orted by clear and
convincing evidence.
24
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POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS S·UF'FICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN
FAVOR OF RESP·ONDENT ON R.ES.PONDENT'S
SEC·OND· CAUSE OF ACTION F'OR THE RECOVERY
OF T'HE REASONABLE VALUE OF R.ES·PONDENT'·s SERVICES.
1.

Whether or not the evidence was sufficient to
support a re~covery on an express promise of
the decedent to pay respondent the specific sum
of $3,300.00 was immaterial.

Paragraph No.4 of respondent's second cause of action reads verbatim as follows:
"4. That between th·e 1st day of June, 1950, and
the 16th day of March, 1953, plaintiff rendered
services to said deceased at said deceased'·s special
instance and request of the reasonable value of
$3,300.00. That said deeeased agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $3,300.00 for said services." (R. 2)
Appellant claims that respondent is limited on her
second cause of action to recovery on an express promise
of Mrs. Giesy to pay respondent the specific sum of $3,300.00. Appellant reaches this result by the following
process of reasoning. (1) That the allegations in paragraph 4 for reeovery in quantu1n 1neruit and for re-covery
on the express promise are written in the conjunctive
rather than the disjunctive. That, therefore, paragraph
4 does not state a claim for recovery on two theories in
the alternative. That the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
do not authorize this form of pleading. That as a result
respondent is limited to recovery on an express prornise
of Mrs. Giesy to pay the specific sum of $3,300.00 for
services rendered. ( 2) That a fair reading of paragraph
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4 leads to the conclusion that respondent was only seeking to recover on an express promise of Mrs. Giesy to
pay the specific sum of $3,300.00 because the allegations
are written in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive.
That the appellant could not determine the exact nature
of respondent's claim by taking her deposition or interrogatories beeause employment of such procedure would
have resulted in waiver of respondent's incompetency
under the dead man's statute to testify at trial. That had
appellant known that respondent was seeking to recover
the reasonable value of resp·ondent's services performed
at Mrs. Giesy's request, app.ellant would have employed
discovery procedures regardless of waiver of respondent's incompetency. That, therefore, appellant was misled :and prejudiced in the preparation of its defense; and,
as a result, respondent is limited to recovery on the express pro:mJse. (App·ellant's brief, pp. 14-17.)
We submit that neither appellant's conclusion nor
the premises on which it is based are correct.
1. Paragraph 4 contains a statement of a claim for
reeovery on two theories, the one in quantum meruit and
the o:ther on an express contract. The allegations are in
the disjunctive and not the conjunctive. The two counts
are expressed in separate sentences, and they are set
forth alternately. If appellant was possibly confused
by absence of use of the word "or," appellant could have
enlightened itself by a motion for more definite statement
under Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which motion would probably have been denied because
the pleading is clear on its face.
26
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2. Appellant claims that it was misled. We do not
know in what plainer language appellant could have been
informed that respondent was seeking to recover the reasonable value of her services performed at Mrs. Giesy's
special instance and request than by the allegation, ''That
between the 1st day of June, 1950, and the 16th day of
March, 1953, plaintiff rendered services to said deceased
at said deceased's special instance and request of the reasonable value of $3,300.00." Furthermore appellant could
have employed discovery procedures to determine the exact nature of respondent's claim. The taking of the deposition of an adverse party does not waive the right
to object to the competency of the party's testimony at
trial under the dead man's statute, Clayton v. Ogden
State Bank, 82 U. 564, 26 P. 2d 545 (1933).
3. Both theories of recovery are alleged 1n one
count as authorized by Rule 8(e) (2) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows :
"A party may set forth two or more statements
of a claim * * * alternately or hypothetically,
either in one count * * * or in separate counts
* * *. When two or more statements are made in
the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not
made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or
more of the alternative staternents. A party may
also state as many separate claims * * * a:s he has
"t ency ***"
regardl ess of cons1s
.
The decision in Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., (Utah,
1953) 264 P. 2d 279, is not authority for appellant's proposition. In the Taylor case the plaintiff declared on an ex-
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press contract only. He neither pleaded (as was done
in the case before this court) nor offere·d proof (as was
done in the case before this court) of a claim in quantum
meruit. At the close of all the evidence the trial 0ourt
took the case under advisement and thereafter adjudged
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in qua;ntum
meruit. The supreme court reversed because the defendant had no notice whatsoever of a claim for the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services. The court distingUished and cited with approval Morris v. Russell (Utah,
19:51) 236 P. 2d 451, wherein the plaintiff pleaded, as was
done in the case before this court, a claim for recovery
on an express contract and a claim for recovery in
quantum meruit and the court held that the, plaintiff
was entitled to recover in quantum meruit.
2.

The evidence was 'Sufficient to support the verdict of th·e jury in favor of respondent for the
recovery on an implied promise of the rea.s·onable value of respondent's services rendered at
decedent's special instance and request.

Appellant's argument on this issue is addressed
solely to conflicting inferences that were resolved by the
jury in favor of respondent. The inferences are drawn
by appellant from a purported quotation of isolra:ted bits
of testimony that is not supported by the record. Appellant asserts that the issue before this court is whether
Mrs. L·ovett and Mrs. Giesy reasonably contemplated
that Mrs. Lovett would be paid for her services, or
whether the services would reasonably be interpreted
as a gratuity. Appellant then states that the eviden~ce does
not show circumstances from which a promise to pay
28
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could reasonably be inferred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1722.)

T'he issue before this court is whether or not there
was any substantial evidence to support the verdict of
the jury. We submit the matter on the record set forth
above, p. 4, et seq., with the following additional comments. One does not engage in employment an average
in excess of six hours a day for thirty-three months
doing the following work: domestic work consisting of
preparing meals, washing dishes, washing and polishing
floors, laundering clothing, washing windows, and the
general household duties of a large apartment; beauty
work -consisting of washing and tinting hair, giving
facials and manicuring nails an average ·of in excess of
once each week; correspondence work consisting of reading and writing mail, taking care of accounts and writing
checks; and, personal work consisting of the care of the
person of another, without both parties contemplating
that the service·s will be paid for in money. This is particularly true where a person in the position of Mrs.
Lovett was specifically asked to take over the duties of a
former domestic employee and was repeatedly told that
she need not be concerned about payment for her services
because she would be well paid. The evidence in this
case is that Mrs. Lovett's services were worth the reasonable value of $1.2'5 to $1.50 per hour (R. 78). Computed at that rate over a period of thirty-three months
at an average of six hours per day, Mrs. Lovett's services
were reasonably worth between two and three times the
amount of the $3,300.00 claim that she presented in pro29
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bate. We submit that the verdict of the jury was amply
supported by the evidence.

POINT III.
·THE INSTR.UCTIONS, AS GIVEN DID NOT
PLACE THE BURDEN ON APPELLANT ·OF NEGATIVING A GIF'T OF' THE LARGE DIAMOND RING
(EX. 1) THAT WAS. THE SUBJEC.T OF APPELLANT''S COUNTERCLAIM. 'THE INS·TRUC'TIONS
DID NO'T PRE·JUDICE APPELLANT.
Appellant claims that Instruction No. 3 placed the
burden on ap·p·ellant of negativing a gift of the large diamond ring that was the subject of ap·p·ellant's counterclaim.

1. Instruction No. 3 read as follows:
"·The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence, as that term is
hereinafter defined, the allegations of the 2nd
cause of action of said complaint, as the same are
set forth in Instruction No. 1; and the burden is
upon the defendant to so prove the allegatiovns of
its counter-claim} as the same are set forth in Instruction No. 2. " (R. 168.) (Italics added.)

Instruction No. 2 (R. 166) set forth the allegations of
appellant's counterclain1, which were in the ordinary form
of a complaint in replevin, and alleged ownership and
right to possession of the large diamond ring in Mrs.
Giesy pTior to her death, right to possession in the executor as h·er successor, a demand on Mrs. Lovett and refusal. ·The burden was on appellant to prove a prima
facie case in replevin, as set forth in Instruction No.2 and
3, hy p·roving original ownership and right to possession
in Mrs. Giesy, right to possession in the executor a:s her
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successor and a de-mand and refusal. R·espondent admitted those facts by proving that Mrs. Giesy purchased the
ring from her own funds in December of 1950 (R. 42, 8991), by adn1itting that appellant was executor of her estate (R. 1) and proving a demand by the executor (Ex.
15, R. 108, 113) and withholding of the ring by respondent (Ex. 16, R .. 111, 113). Supra,, p. 10 et seq.
It then became the burden of respondent to prove
by elear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Giesy gave the
large diamond ring to her. This burden on respondent
was amply covered by Instructions No. 6A and 9, which
were not in conflict with Instruction No. 3. Instruction
No. 6A read as follows :
''The plaintiff, Mrs. Lovett, claim'S she owns
each of the items of jewelry in this case because,
she claims, the jewelry was given to her by Mrs.
Giesy. You are instructed that a person who
claims ownership of property by gift has the burden of proving each of the elements of gift by
clear and convincing evid:ence.
"If you do not find that all of these elements of a
gift to Mrs. Lovett have been proved by clear
and convincing evidence, it would be your duty to
find in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff." (R. 172.) (Italics added.)
In Instruction No. 9 the court instructed the jury that
the intention of the donor to make a gift must be shown
by the evidence to be clear and unmistakable (R. 175).
The instructions, when read as a whole as required by
Instruction No. 13 (R. 179), did not place the burden on
appellant to negative a gift of the large diamond ring.
They did place the burden on respondent to prove the

31
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gift by clear and convincing evidence.
2. The instructions as given could not possibly have
prejudiced ~appellant. The uncontradicted testimony of
respondent's witnesses (R. 89-91, R. 43-4·6), the uncontradicted written evidence in Mrs. Giesy's own handwriting
(Ex. 2) and appellant's own evidence (Dr. David E.
Smith, R. 11H-120) showed conclusively that Mrs. Giesy
did give the large diamond ring to Mrs. Lovett. Appellant offered no evidence to the contrary. We submit that
the evidence is conclusive that Mrs. Giesy gave Mrs.
Lovett the ring and that ·as a matter of law Mrs. Lovett
is entitled to the ring as against appellant's counterclaim. The instructions could not, therefore, have prejudiced appellant.
POINT IV.
T'HE INSTRUCTION'S A·S GIVEN WERE
NOT· A MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW PERTAINING TO DE.LIVERY OF· ·THE GIF!T OF JEWELRY
(EXS. 3-11, EXCEPT EX. 6) T'HAT WAS THE SUBJECT O·F· R·ES.P·ONDENT'S· FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PREJUDICE
APPELLANT·.
1

The second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 reads
as follows:
"If you believe ~and find from the evidence
that Mrs. Giesy delivered the jewelry in question
to plaintiff, or authorized or directed Mrs. Maddocks to deliver th·e jewelry to plaintiff, with the
intent that the jewelry was to go to and belong
to plaintiff as her own p~roperty, then you are instructed that a valid gift of the jewelry was made
to plaintiff and on this issue your verdict must be
In favor of plaintiff and against defendant on
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plaintiff's first cause of action." (R. 171.)

1. Appellant claims that Instruction No. 6 was erroneous in that under the instruction the jury could have
found that delivery to Mrs. Maddocks was a sufficient
delivery to constitute a completed gift without delivery
of the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett, the donee, appellant's brief,
pp. 24-25. We submit that under the instructions as given
the jury could not have found that delivery to Mrs. Maddocks was a sufficient delivery to constitute a completed
gift. The instructions by their express terms and by necessary implication did require that the jury find that the
jewelry was in fact delivered to Mrs. Lovett by Mrs.
Giesy or by Mrs. Maddocks acting pursuant to Mrs.
Giesy's authorization and direction.
a. The clear import of Instruction No. 6, standing
alone, was that the jury must find that the jewelry was
in fact delivered to Mrs. Lovett by Mrs. Giesy or by Mrs.
Maddocks. The vvords, "If you believe and find from
the evidence that Mrs. Giesy delivered the jewelry in
question to plaintiff, * * *" in the, phrase, "If you believe
and find fron1 the evidence that Mrs. Giesy delivered the
jewelry in question to plaintiff, or authorized or directed
~irs. Maddocks to deliver the jewelry to plaintiff, * * *''
are an express or necessarily implied instruction that
~Irs. Giesy must have delivered the jewelry to Mrs.
Lovett directly or that she must have done so indirectly
through Mrs. Maddocks acting under her authorization
and direction.
b. Instruction No. 5 (R. 170) and Instruction No.6,
when read as a part of a connected whole, required the
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jury to believe that the jewelry was in fact delivered to
Mrs. Lovett by Mrs. Giesy or by Mrs. Maddocks acting
under Mrs. Giesy''S authorization and direction. InstruCtion No. 6 required the jury to believe that Mrs. Giesy delivered the jewelry in question to Mrs. Lovett, or authorized or directed Mrs. Maddocks to deliver the jewelry
to Mrs. Lovett. Instruction No. 5 provided that, "Delivery, as used in these instructions, means there must be
an actual trarnsfer by the donor of the pDss·ession, dominion and control of the property to the done.e. A m,anual
transfer of the property by the owner, or by a person authorized or directed to do so by the owner to the d:onee, is
a sufficient delivery, as that term is used and defined in
these instructions." (Italics added.) Instruction No.5 required the jury to believe that there was an actual transfer of possession, dominion and control of the property,
to the donee by the donor, or by the person authorized or
directed to do so by the donor, and Instruction No. 6 required the jury to believe that Mrs. Giesy delivered the
jewelry to Mrs. Lovett, or authorized or directed Mrs.
Maddocks to do so. The only reasonable interpretation
of the two instructions when read together is that the
jury was required to find that there was an actual transfer of possession, dominion and control of the property
to Mrs. Lovett as donee by Mrs. Giesy or by Mrs. Maddocks acting under Mrs. Giesy's authorization and direction.
2. App·ellant also asserts that Instruction No. 6 is
erroneous because under the instruction the jury was not
required to believe that delivery to respondent was ever
intended by Mrs. Giesy to be completed, appellant's brief,
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pp. 24-25. We submit that appellant's contention is not
correct. Instruction No. 6 expressly provided that Mrs.
Giesy must have delivered the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett, "or
authorized or directed Mrs. Maddocks to deliver the
jewelry to Mrs. Lovett with the intent that the jewelry
go to and belong to Mrs. L·ovett as her own property.''
Instruction No. 5 provided that delivery meant that there
must have been an actual transfer of possession, dominion
and control of the subject matter of the gift to the donee
by the donor or by a person authorized or direeted to do
so by the donor. Both Instruction No. 6, standing alone,
and the instructions as a whole, expressly required that
the jury find that Mrs. Giesy intended the jewelry to be
delivered to Mrs. Lovett.
3.

The instructions as given could not possibly have

prejudiced appellant. The admitted facts of the case
were that the jewelry was in fact delivered to Mrs.
Lovett. Respondent's and appellant's own witnesses testified that the jevvelry was delivered to Mrs. Lovett. Respondent's vvitnesses testified that Mrs. Maddocks delivered the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett at the apartment pursuant to Mrs. Giesy's authorization. Respondent's witnesses further testified that, when Mrs. Giesy thereafter
was informed at the hospital that the jewelry had been delivered to Mrs. Lovett, Mrs. Giesy told Mrs. Lovett not
to turn the jewelry over to the executor, that the jewelry
was Mrs. Lovett's and that she wanted Mrs. Lovett to
have it. See testimony of Mrs. Maddocks (R. 79-84) and
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testimony of Mr. Lovett (R. 48-52'). Dr. David E. Smith,
appellant''S own witness, testified that Mrs. Giesy told
him ~at the apartment that she was going to turn the
jewelry over to Mrs. LOivett and that thereafter at the
hospital Mrs. Gie:sy told him that she had delivered the
jewelry to Mrs. LoiVett (R. 117-124). The evidence is undisputed that Mrs. Lovett had possession of the jewelry
immediately following Mrs. Giesy's death. The only question in the case was whether the jewelry was delivered
to Mrs. Lovett for safekeeping or as a gift, and that
question was clearly covered by Instructions No. 6, 6A
and 9, in which the court charged the jury that the intention of the donor to make a gift must be shown by .the
evidence to he clear and unmistakable.
Resp~ectfully

submitted,

McBROOM & HANNI,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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